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Serie I-ARUIWA ist, mein Verständnis zum Gedicht (Tanka 短歌) von Dogen (Besonders in einer klaren Wintternacht erscheint der Mound sehr hell. Ich denke in der Zeit von Dogen war das Moundlicht (Reflexion) noch heller als heutige.) Bewußtsein, wie Dinge (Ereignis) zu verstehen, dass eine kleine Substanz/ein kleines Wesen/Element der ungeschlossenen in einem Moment des Lebens ist. (Phänomenologie)

題しらず (Ohne Titel)

山のはにほのめくよひの月影に光もうすくとぶ蛍かな

(yamanohani honomekuyo(h)ino tsukikageni hikarimousuku tobuhotarukana)

– A Japanese Poem (Waka/和歌: Tanka/短歌) by Dōgen Zenji/ 道元禅師

Zum Thema Bewußtsein.

Was ich aufgenommen habe, "Wassertropfen" und was ich dabei aufnehmen wollte,  "Lichtreflektion der Objekte (Wassertropfen und Raum und räumlicher Zustand)".

Aufnahmen: Spiegelreflexkamera Nikon (Modell aus den 70er Jahren, ohne Autofocus/ohne Automation)

Mind in eastern philosophy

- Zen Buddhism

"In the Shobogenzo, the Japanese philosopher Dogen argued that body and mind are neither ontologically nor phenomenologically distinct but are characterized by a oneness called shin jin (bodymind)."

„Minimalism in the visual arts: “There are two distinct terms: the known constant and the experienced variable”, Morris maintained, touching on the philosophical dichotomy of knowing and seeing. “You see a shape – these kinds of shapes with the kind of symmetry they have – you see it, you believe you know it, but you never see what you know, because you always see the distortion and it seems that you know in the plan view.”² Arnheim³, however, suggested that the brain compensates for or corrects what the eyes see (Minimal Art – The Critical Perspective, Frances Colpitt, 1990). In a way of thinking of minimalism, it is possible to reduce the attribute and to reinforce the message and the perception of the arts; the minimalism is thus a complete art form. But on the other hand the expression and image logic is rejected in minimalism by automating the production. Of course, technology gives us more and more new opportunities that not only serve as a function, but rather (life-) styles and concepts can be developed by new ways of thinking. Whatever is indicated, however, our basic existence is not changed by technology; we live and we die as the law of nature wants.

After the digital revolution of Minimal Art today, minimalism is a kind of reflection of contemporary society. I think simultaneously of humanity in the digital industrial system. The question is what art presents to us and what we see and understand what is made visible with art.“¹

1. Excerpt of a comment: Computerised Motion by the Notion as Visual Composition

 - Contemplation for the video work ‘One Motorbike, One Arm, Two Cameras’ (2014) by Ainara Elgoibar, Erika Matsunami, Research Chatalogue, November 2014/March 2015

Objective Time and the Experience of Time: Husserl’s Theory of Time in Light of Some Theses of A. Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity

„When Gestalt theory informs us that a figure on a background is the simplest sense -given avaivale to us, we reply that this is not a contingent characteristic if factual perception, which leaves us free, in an ideal analysis, to bring in the notion of impressions. It is the very definition of the phenomenon of perception, that without which a phenomenon cannot be said to be perception at all. The perceptual 'something' is always in the middle of something else, it always forms part of a 'field'.

(...)

I shall therefore give up any attempt to define sensation as pure impression. Rather, to see is to have colours or lights, to hear is to have sounds, to sense (sentir) is to have qualities. To know what sense-experience is, then, is it not enough to have seen a red or to have heard an A? But red and green are not sensations, they are the sensed (sensibles), and quality is not an element of counsciousness, but a property of the object. Instead of providing a simple means of deliming sensations, if we consider it in the experience itself which evinces it, the quality is as rich and mysterious as the object, or indeed the whole spectacle, perceived.

(...)

We think we know perfectly well what 'seeing', 'hearing', 'sensing' are, because perception has long provided us with objects which are coloured or which emit sounds. When we thry to analyse it, we transpose these objects into consciousness. We commit what psychologists call 'the experience error', which means that what we know to be in things themselves we immediately take as being in our consciousness of them. We make perception out things perceived. And since perceived things, themselves are obviously accessible only through perception, we end by understanding neither. We are caught up in the world and we do not succeed in extracting ourselves from it in order to achieve consciousness of the world." (Phenomenology of Perception (Phénomènologie de la perception), Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Paris: Gallimard, 1945, (trans. Kegan Pauls, New York: Routledge, 1958))

Abstraktion - Kapitalismus - Subjektivität

Die Wahrheitsfunktion des Werks in der Moderne

Sebastian Egenhofer

1. Aufl. 2012, 441 Seiten, kart.

ISBN: 978-3-7705-4397-7

Die Krise der Repräsentation durchläuft im 20. Jahrhundert einen Moment, in dem Kunstwerke nicht mehr von bloßen Objekten zu unterscheiden sind. In der amerikanischen Minimal Art der sechziger Jahre ist das Werk auf ein Ding reduziert, das, statt ein Bild einer Welt zu entwerfen, nur sein eigenes Vorhandensein auszusagen scheint: it is what it is, what you see is what you see. Seit dem Durchgang durch den Spiegel dieser Tautologie bezieht sich Kunst in vielfältiger Weise nicht mehr auf eine repräsentierte, sondern auf die Welt, der es selbst angehört. Die minimalistische Situation kann so als Schwelle zur zeitgenössischen Kunstproduktion verstanden werden. Das Buch beschreibt die doppelte Genealogie dieser Schwellensituation, indem es einerseits die Geschichte der Bildabstraktion vom Impressionismus bis zu Frank Stellas protominimalistischer Malerei verfolgt und andererseits das Verhältnis des modernen Werks zur kapitalistischen Warenproduktion analysiert, das emblematisch in Marcel Duchamps Ready-mades zum Ausdruck kommt. Zwischen den extremen Polen der modernen Repräsentationskritik, dem Ready-made und dem monochromen Bild, wird so eine Topik der Kunst der Moderne aufgespannt, von der aus neues Licht auf die Arbeit von Künstlern wie Marcel Duchamp und Piet Mondrian, Andy Warhol und Ad Reinhardt, Donald Judd und Jackson Pollock fällt.

I'd like to introduce a fine arts catalogue of disability artists at das Mosaik e.V., Berlin (ed. Das Mosaik e.V., Berlin) „Kunst kommt aus dem Schnabel, wie er gewachsen ist".

.

Book review (excerpt, ©The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press; all rights reserved)

Orders of Appearance

Daniel Spaulding

Sebastian Egenhofer,

Abstraktion – Kapitalismus –Subjektivität: Die Wahrheitsfunktion des Werks in der Moderne (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2008), 255 colour and b&w illns, 441 pp., ISBN: 978-3-7705-4397-7.

Sebastian Egenhofer, Towards an Aesthetics of Production, trans. James Gussen (Zürich: Diaphanes, 2018), 53 b&w illns, 299 pp.

Estrangement and recognition will alternate in the mind of any Anglo-American art historian reading SebastianEgenhofer’s two books. His signposts are, if anything, over-familiar: in Abstraktion – Kapitalismus – Subjektivität, the earlier volume, they are Marcel Duchamp, Piet Mondrian, Jackson Pollock, Andy Warhol, and the American Minimalists of the 1960s (Donald Judd is his key figure). The introduction of Michael Asher and Thomas Hirschhornin Towards an Aesthetics of Production (originally published by Diaphanes as Produktionsa ̈sthetikin 2010) only barely stretches the canon. These are the white male totems of acertain late-twentieth and early twenty-first-century arthistory. They are, in particular, the totems of the so-called October school, whose representatives Egenhofer cites atregular intervals. What Egenhofer has done, however, is tomake of his landmarks the stuff of a vastly ambitious conceptual framework that has no close analogue in Anglophone art history – nor, so far as I am aware, in anyother language. To render that achievement legible requires translation in more senses than one.

   Egenhofer earned his doctorate under Gottfried Boehm,a key figure in continental Bildwissenschaft (‘image studies’,more or less). Boehm’s hermeneutic approach to ‘iconicdifference’ is a palpable influence on his student’s work, asthe distinction between images and other kinds of things is likewise the pivot of Egenhofer’s theory. It is not, ofcourse, that artworks are something other than things. Butthey make of their ‘world–relation’ (Weltverhältnis: a central term in the earlier, still untranslated book) a problem that they address head-on, rather than a convention they presume.¹ Modern artworks, or at least the ones that Egenhofer cares about, disclose their own production insuch a way that a ‘rift’ emerges between what he calls thehorizontal and vertical dimensions of their existence. These dimensions are, respectively, that of immediate presence inthe viewer’s space and time (an aspect of the artwork thathe often simply calls the ‘image’, or Bild), on the onehand, and on the other hand the temporal ‘archive’ or ‘back side’ of the work’s production (in a word, history). Egenhofer uses the term ‘archive’ in an expansive sense torefer not only to the physical remnants of an artwork’smaking, but also, and perhaps more importantly, to its social and institutional frames, such as the gallery, the mu-seum, and the discourses of art criticism. It is perhaps forthis reason, too, that the author devotes nearly as much of his attention to artists’ writings as to their paintings orsculptures. Individual practices emerge in this presentationas sometimes self-contradictory bundles of form, matter, and discourse.

(...)

   Secondly, in addition to class, the two other great structures of social appearance in capitalist modernity, and in several other kinds of society for that matter, are gender and race, each of which interacts with class in complex ways. Gender and race are constituted and limited forms of appearance, as well; they cannot possibly remain external to an ‘anamnesis of the genesis’¹³ of aesthetic appearance, too, since the aesthetic (or anyway the institution called art) is similarly an ordering and limitation, a cross-section, of a broader continuum of possible practices, forms, objects, and metabolisms with nature. In a similar way, ‘male’ and ‘female’ are cross-sections, extractions, from a continuum of possible corporeal, sexual, and cultural modes of existence that are richer and deeper than the gender binary can abide. Race, in turn, sifts the category of the human as such, assigning some to privilege and others to social death on the basis of what is, nominally, an aesthetic fact, namely skin colour. (Frantz Fanon speaks of this as ‘epidermalization’.) Recognition of these dynamics might throw a certain light on Egenhofer’s choice of objects, too. We encounter Robert Morris, but not Yvonne Rainer or Simone Forti; Anne Truitt, Agnes Martin, Louise Bourgeois, Lynda Benglis, and Yayoi Kusama are mentioned only in passing, and Lee Bontecou only as an object of Judd’s criticism. There are no black artists at all; neither are there any artists frooutside the USA or Western Europe. This is not a plea for quotas but only for historical accuracy.

   There is, however, another and perhaps even more fundamental question that one can put to Egenhofer’s delimitation of his field. Though he implicitly adopts Boehm’s notion of iconic difference, at certain moments he seems hardly to mind the distinction between ‘aesthetic’ appearance and appearance as such; since they are congruent, the one is just a region of the other. At the very end of Aesthetics, for instance, he writes that ‘anything in the world can serve as the hinge to the infinite ground of beings’; any ‘thing that does not cling to the consistency of what already is’ but which rather ‘turns the non-self-evident character of its existence outward and shapes it into a resistance’ may accomplish the work of truth–production. One should hope so; one should hope that truth happens in places other than the gallery. So, as Christopher Wood asks of Belting: why then is art so persistently Egenhofer’s object? Why does he preserve art – canonical art, at that – as his ineluctable frame, when it seems, rather, that the constitution of any form of appearance whatsoever is the real stake of his  inquiry? Abstraktion and Aesthetics propose a theory of the production of semblance, but not of the production of art’s autonomy. Here perhaps is an immediacy not yet sublated. I am not sure there is an explanation for this other than historical inertia; that is, the fact of art’s institutionalization as just such a privileged zone of ontological instability. Egehnofer’s is not, admittedly, a harmonizing political aesthetics a` la Friedrich Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, since ‘strife’ is its keynote; what I am saying is just that art here maintains its privilege as a space of onto-political experimentation. But the horizon of his aesthetics of production may not be art at all.

If AI gives us/me a graph, we/I have to read, ...
In this graph, at first, I thought that the position of AI (satellite) is the same and different times of perception by AI. Therefore I started to think, what I want to perceive in this graph. In my opinion, this graph is the only information that could be seeing as Vorstellung by AI perception.
For what is this graph, that is for scientists exploring or others, and I started to research in papers. AI information is sheared, as well in Kunst-Forschung. Also, AI Information in my Ph.D. Kunst-Forschung is important, particularly in the exploring From threefoldness to multi-foldness.
Therefore I'll back to my artistic research on Philosophy of Perception.

-> a subject desire in contrast to minimalism

e.g. massproduction

Two distinctions of the meaning 'desire':

- Dogen (1200–1253)

Negative desire -> Bonno 煩悩 (Kleshas) and its body-mind problem -> Healing -> Physis -> It contrasts to metaphysic.

- Jean-Luc Godard (1930–)

Harmony of Motivation, Aspiration -> Inspiration -> It might be negative also, if it were in term of idealism, we can never know about whole of. 

His suggesion is "The cinema substitutes for our gaze a world.", that contrasts to idealism, but rather it is phenomenological. -> Philosophy 

in harmony with our desires -> It would be by a collectivity of a production.

“With reproduction as the moment of individuality, the living being posits itself as an actual individuality, a self-related being-for-self; but at the same time it is a real relation outwards, the reflection of particularity or irritability towards an other, towards the objective world. The process of life, which is enclosed within the individual, passes over into a relation to the presupposed objectivity as such, in consequence of the fact that when the individual posits itself as a subjective totality, the moment of its determinateness as a relation to externality becomes a totality as well” (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Science of Logic).⁴

For a long time people have dealt with humanity and its existence. Art has assumed an important role as a visualization of thinking. However, art not only has the iconographic character to be a symbolization, expression and representation, but it also influences the human psychology in relation to the brain and the individual perception and emotion, etc.

For example, Zeki⁵ claims: “Yet no one has been able to relate the variability in artistic creativity and appreciation to any given brain structure or process, partly because no one knows the neural processes underlying the creative impulse or brain variability. And yet these differences in brain organization, whatever they may turn out to be, are superimposed on a common plan that is characteristic of all brains. It is this common organization that allows us to communicate through art and about art without using the written or spoken word.”⁶

In the case of the mathematical information as creation which is provided by the digital sensors of the computer and the programmed idea or the concept that arises from the idea of the human, and when this artwork (information of image) enters through the brain, according to this, I start to contemplate on the automatization (programmed recording without human eyes – “without seeing”) and also reflect on their creation (what is robotic creation).

The creation of visual art is a kind of intensive non-verbal “communication” that remains of the statement on the work of Elgoibar, or it could also “not remain” a statement of his work, it’s thereby made us descriptive or perspicuous about the technology in human life; what “alive, mortal and fragile” means for us.

Zeki claims in his essay on the influence of “abstraction” in the memory system on the brain and with reference to philosophy its “idealism” from the neurological aspect that: “Abstraction is also imposed on the brain by the limitations of its memory system, since it does away with the need to recall every detail. (...) Abstraction leads naturally to the formation of ideals. Plato used the term ‘ideal’ to mean a universal – derived from the intellect alone – as opposed to the particular, derived from sensory experience. Because memory of the particular fades, the ideal built by the brain from many particulars becomes the only real thing about which we can have knowledge, much as Plato and Kant believed.”⁷

(...)"²

2.

Kozeptuelle Fotographie, 1969, zwei Blätter, Kugelschreiber auf Papier, je.  29,7 x 21 cm, Valie Export (Ausschnitt)

Monograph Valie Export: Serien, Hg. Thomas Trummer, Frakfurt am Main: REVOLVER Archiv für akteulle Kunst, 2004

Konzeptuelle Fotografie = Konstruktion

Aufnahmeweise = Konstruktion

Montage = Komposition

Ich sehe in der Konzeptuelle Fotografie eine Station auf dem Weg zum Arbeiten mit dem Fotoaparat. Durch dem Medium inne wohnende Eigenschaften wie Belichtung, Zeit, Schärfe, als auch den periodischen Möglichkeiten, Aufnahmentechniken des Mediums.

Diese tonalen und konzeptuellen Überlegungen sind einige der Möglichkeiten der Entwicklung in der Fotografie, sie nicht nur als Abbildungsmedium zu sehen.

1. Konzept

Die Methoden des Sehens, dass wir in unserem Gesichtsfeld nicht alles genau und scharf erkennen können, sondern durch Drehen des Kopfes nach links bzw. rechts oder auch nur der Augen, oder heben und senken, sich erst das gesamte Bild (ergibt).

Jede neue Bewegung, eine neue Zusammenstellung, einen neuen Raum

... der Fotografie

Es bedarf natürlich noch intensiver Beschäftigung. Ich möchte es aber nicht mit dem Film (Bewegte Bilder) vergleichen, denn hier

(...) 

Constructivism (art)

We are rather algorithmically in the contemporary today's soceity. -> Komplexitätstheorie

But, what is 'algorithm'?

- Heuritics

- Cognitive map "Neurological basis[edit]

Cognitive mapping is believed to largely be a function of the hippocampus. The hippocampus is connected to the rest of the brain in such a way that it is ideal for integrating both spatial and nonspatial information. Connections from the postrhinal cortex and the medial entorhinal cortex provide spatial information to the hippocampus. Connections from the perirhinal cortex and lateral entorhinal cortex provide nonspatial information. The integration of this information in the hippocampus makes the hippocampus a practical location for cognitive mapping, which necessarily involves combining information about an object's location and its other features.^[10]"

Wann Export geboren hat, derselbe Jahrgang wie meine Mutter ist. Export ist eine progressive Künstlerin.

„Digitale Fotografie“, 2001, S/W-Fotografie, 8-teilig, (Auswahl), je. 75,6 x 62,6 cm, Valie Export (Monograph Valie Export: Serien, Hg. Thomas Trummer, Frakfurt am Main: REVOLVER Archiv für akteulle Kunst, 2004)

There is the high technological 'system' today. e.g. Satellite

Satellit (von lateinisch satelles ‚Begleiter‘) steht für:

• Satellit (Astronomie), ein Himmelskörper („Mond“) auf einer Umlaufbahn um ein anderes Objekt

Technik:

• Satellit (Raumfahrt), ein künstlicher Raumflugkörper, der einen Himmelskörper auf einer festen Umlaufbahn umrundet
• ein Rundfunksatellit bei der Beschreibung des Übertragungsweges von Fernseh- und Hörfunkprogrammen („Empfang über Satellit“)
• Satellit (Luftfahrt), Erweiterungsgebäude zu einem bestehenden Flughafenterminal
• Satellit (Lautsprecher), bei Soundsystemen oder Heimkinoanlagen einen kleinen Mittelhochtonlautsprecher
• Bedienungssatellit, ein in Fahrzeugen der Marke Citroën verwendetes Kombielement
• Kurzform für Satellitenfahrzeug in der Lagerlogistik, ein Kanalfahrzeug zur automatischen Bedienung von Kanallagern, siehe Shuttle (Lagertechnik)
• Satellitenseite, eine für Suchmaschinen optimierte Internetseite, siehe unter Brückenseite
• SMS Satellit, ein 1893 in Dienst gestelltes Torpedokanonenboot der k.u.k. Kriegsmarine

Biologie:

• Satellit (Chromosom), der Endabschnitt am kurzen Schenkel eines Chromosoms
• Satelliten-DNA, sich vielfach wiederholende Sequenzmotive von Nukleinsäuren
• Satellit (Biologie), ein unselbständiges Virus
• Satellitenzelle, eine bestimmte Art von Gliazellen, siehe Mantelzelle
• eine Art von Muskelzellen, auch Satellitenzelle, siehe Myoblast
• der Wachstumstyp des Haemophilus influenzae auf Blutagarplatten mit Hilfe einer zweiten Bakterienart, siehe Ammenwachstum

Six-factor Model of Psychological Well-being[edit]

Carol Ryff's multidimensional model of psychological well-being postulated six factors which are key for well-being (is based on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, "where the goal of life isn't feeling good, but is instead about living virtuously"):^{[web 1]}

1. Self-acceptance
2. Personal growth
3. Purpose in life
4. Environmental mastery
5. Autonomy
6. Positive relations with others

2. The Critique of Scientism (Wittgenstein’s Aesthetics First published Fri Jan 26, 2007; substantive revision Wed Jul 30, 2014)

Wittgenstein turns to the idea of a science of aesthetics, an idea for which he has precious little sympathy (“almost too ridiculous for words” [Wittgenstein 1966, 11]). But as is often the case in Wittgenstein's philosophical work, it does not follow from this scornful or dismissive attitude that he has no interest in the etiology of the idea, or in excavating the hidden steps or components of thought that have led some to this idea. In the ensuing discussion he unearths a picture of causation that under-girds the very idea of a scientific explanation of aesthetic judgment or preference. And in working underground in this way, he reveals the analogies to cases of genuine scientific explanation, where the “tracing of a mechanism” just is the process of giving a causal account, i.e. where the observed effect is described as the inevitable result of prior links in the causal chain leading to it. If, to take his example, an architect designs a door and we find ourselves in a state of discontentment because the door, within the larger design of the façade (within its stylistic “language-game”, we might say), is too low, we are liable to describe this on the model of scientific explanation. Then, we make a substantive of the discontent, see it as the causal result of the lowness of the door, and in identifying the lowness as the cause, think ourselves able to dislodge the inner entity, the discontent, by raising the door. But this mischaracterizes our aesthetic reactions, or what we might call, by analogy to moral psychology, our aesthetic psychology.

2.1 Aesthetic Reactions

The true aesthetic reaction—itself rarely described in situ in terms of a proximate cause (“In these cases the word ‘cause’ is hardly ever used at all” [Wittgenstein 1966, 14]) is far more immediate, and far more intertwined with, and related to, what we see in^[4] the work of art in question. “It is a reaction analogous to my taking my hand away from a hot plate” (Wittgenstein 1966). He thus says:

To say: “I feel discomfort and know the cause”, is entirely misleading because “know the cause” normally means something quite different. How misleading it is depends on whether when you said: “I know the cause”, you meant it to be an explanation or not. “I feel discomfort and know the cause” makes it sound as if there were two things going on in my soul—discomfort and knowing the cause (Wittgenstein 1966, 14).

But there is, as he next says, a “Why?” to such a case of aesthetic discomfort, if not a cause (on the conventional scientific model). But both the question and its multiform answers will take, indeed, very different forms in different cases. Again, if what he suggested before concerning the significance of context for meaning is right, the very meaning of the “Why?”-question will vary case to case. This is not a weaker thesis concerning variation on the level of inflection, where the underlying structure of the “Why?”-question is causal. No, here again that unifying, model-imposing manner of proceeding would leave out a consideration of the nuances that give the “Why?”-question its determinate sense in the first place.

But again, Wittgenstein's fundamental concern here is to point out the great conceptual gulf that separates aesthetic perplexities from the methodology of empirical psychology. To run studies of quantified responses to controlled and isolated aesthetic stimuli, where emergent patterns of preference, response, and judgment are recorded within a given population's sample, is to pass by the true character of the aesthetic issue—the actual puzzlement, such as we feel it, will be conceptual, not empirical. And here again we see a direct link to his work in the philosophy of psychology: the penultimate passage of Part II of Philosophical Investigations (1958, sec. xiv), was “The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by” (Wittgenstein 1958, II, iv, 232). He says, near the close of this part of his lectures on aesthetics, “Aesthetic questions have nothing to do with psychological experiments, but are answered in an entirely different way” (Wittgenstein 1966, 17). A stimulus-response model adapted from scientific psychology—what we might now call the naturalizing of aesthetics—falsifies the genuine complexities of aesthetic psychology through a methodologically enforced reduction to one narrow and unitary conception of aesthetic engagement. For Wittgenstein complexity, and not reduction to unitary essence, is the route to conceptual clarification. Reduction to a simplified model, by contrast, yields only the illusion of clarification in the form of conceptual incarceration (“a picture held us captive”).^[5]

- René Descartes [ʁəˈne deˈkaʁt] (latinisiert Renatus Cartesius; * 31. März 1596 in La Haye en Touraine; † 11. Februar 1650 in Stockholm) 

- Die Französische Revolution von 1789 bis 1799

-  Die Begriffe Frühe Neuzeit, Frühneuzeit, Frühmoderne oder Neuere Geschichte bezeichnen in der Geschichte Europas üblicherweise das Zeitalter zwischen dem Spätmittelalter (Mitte 13. Jahrhundert bis Ende 15. Jahrhundert) und dem Übergang vom 18. Jahrhundert zum 19. Jahrhundert.

- Die Entdeckung Amerikas 1492 ist die Anlandung kastilischer Seefahrer unter Führung des genuesisch­stämmigen Cristoforo Colombo auf einer Insel der Bahamas – im Glauben, einen transatlantischen Seeweg nach Indien gefunden zu haben. Laut dem von Bartolomé de Las Casas wiedergegebenen Bordbuch des Christoph Kolumbus wurde die von ihren karibischenEinwohnern Guanahani genannte Insel im Oktober 1492 erreicht. Mit dieser ersten von vier Seefahrten des Kolumbus begann die spanische Kolonisierung Amerikas.

Anomie (/ˈænəˌmi/) is "the condition in which society provides little moral guidance to individuals".^[1] Anomie may evolve from conflict of belief systems^[2] and causes breakdown of social bonds between an individual and the community (both economic and primary socialization).^[3] In a person this can progress into a dysfunction in ability to integrate within normative situations of their social world - e.g., an unruly personal scenario that results in fragmentation of social identity and rejection of values.^{[4][citation needed]}

The term, commonly understood to mean normlessness, is believed to have been popularized by French sociologist Émile Durkheim in his influential book Suicide (1897). However, Durkheim first introduced the concept of anomie in his 1893 work The Division of Labour in Society. Durkheim never used the term normlessness;^[5] rather, he described anomie as "derangement", and "an insatiable will".^{[6][need quotation to verify]} Durkheim used the term "the malady of the infinite" because desire without limit can never be fulfilled; it only becomes more intense.^[7]

For Durkheim, anomie arises more generally from a mismatch between personal or group standards and wider social standards, or from the lack of a social ethic, which produces moral deregulation and an absence of legitimate aspirations. This is a nurtured condition:

Most sociologists associate the term with Durkheim, who used the concept to speak of the ways in which an individual's actions are matched, or integrated, with a system of social norms and practices … anomie is a mismatch, not simply the absence of norms. Thus, a society with too much rigidity and little individual discretion could also produce a kind of anomie ...^[8]

Dualist solutions to the mind–body problem:

In Western Philosophy, the earliest discussions of dualist ideas are in the writings of Plato who maintained that humans' "intelligence" (a faculty of the mind or soul) could not be identified with, or explained in terms of, their physical body.^[29][30] However, the best-known version of dualism is due to René Descartes (1641), and holds that the mind is a non-extended, non-physical substance, a "res cogitans".^[5] Descartes was the first to clearly identify the mind with consciousness and self-awareness, and to distinguish this from the brain, which was the seat of intelligence. He was therefore the first to formulate the mind–body problem in the form in which it still exists today.^[5]

Models of Reduction and Categories of Reductionism

"The dematerialized images of film are the raw contents of sensation, without the forms, horizons, and contexts that usually orient them. And this is how film crosses the threshold of a new kind of perception, one that is below or above the human. This new perception is multiple and anarchic, nonintentional and asubjective; it is no longer subordinated to the requirements of representation and idealization, recognition and designation.⁶⁰ What I argue through Nancy and Denis is that this model of perception need not be situated at a pre-personal level. In other words, we do not necessarily need to move beyond the human to shift our understanding of perception to that which is always mediated, is often non-intentional, asubjective and multiple. In this vein, in critiquing the subject that classical film theory constructs as its viewer, Shaviro assumes that subject and then dismisses it as ‘human’, and in need of displacement. Therefore, in his account, we need to move above or below the human level to cross to a new form of perception. In this way he leaves the subject of classical theory intact and moves elsewhere for an account of film perception. Rather than completely shifting away from the human, however, I argue that the human is not limited to the ‘subject’ that film addresses, nor does classical film exhaust the reality of human perception or definitively account for what is ‘natural’. The concept of the human is contingent, mutable and flexible. It can stretch to encompass changing notions of modes of perception, new ways of understanding the body, and challenges to false dichotomies such as natural/technical or human/animal. Neither above nor below the human, we need to think the human itself as not subordinated to the requirements of representation. Furthermore, we do not have to escape the category of the human to get a perception that is always already becoming-other, technological, often non-intentional, and without guiding consciousness.⁶¹

   Like Deleuzian models, I argue for a way of thinking about film using concepts that focus not on cognition and referential meaning, but instead on forces and material encounters. In contrast to a Deleuzian approach, however, I think through these encounters in terms of subjects. But in my reading the subject is constituted inter-relationally or in alterity. This understanding works to dismantle oppressive formulations of the subject that have been historically dominant in Western thought. The subject is not thought of as autonomous, discrete or as having mastery over her environment. She is not easily able to separate self and other or to categorise others on the bases of various adjectives. This de-subjectified subject makes it difficult to operate in ways that are dominating or that reduce others to a known quantity. In contrast to Deleuzian antihumanism, I formulate here an ethics that uses humans, but humans refigured or thought otherwise. Operating from the standpoint of ethics and wanting to hold on to a notion of responsibility, the particular perspective I am moving towards here maintains a notion of a subject, however interrupted.

   Paradoxically, models of ethics that try to completely move away from the subject often in fact become solipsistic – and the web of relations in which we are enmeshed and act recede from view. Here I refer specifically to Deleuzian formulations and their roots in Spinoza and Nietzsche. From Spinoza the emphasis on positive affects as a basis for forming adequate thoughts from which to act in the world, while inspiring, requires a great deal of elaboration to convincingly argue that it can address the ways in which our responsibilities and relatedness may often diminish our powers to act or undo us in necessarily painful ways. The Nietzschean emphasis on an active forgetting of the past and a willing singular affirmation in the present, while it absolves us of our guilty consciences in ways that can be affectively liberating, may let too many off the hook in terms of our ethical accountability and responsibility. I worry that it may absolve precisely those who have played the greatest role in past atrocities that have diminished and continue to diminish the power of particular peoples. A considerable amount of work must be done to make a convincing argument that Deleuze and Guattari’s ethics can encompass a notion of responsibility, although their focus on desiring productivity and lines of flight provides needed resources for thinking about resistance to the dogmas of late capitalism. Tamsin Lorraine attempts such a reworking through her argument that Deleuzian assemblages can be read as larger groups or communities, extending their framework beyond the individual-as-assemblage, to which it falls prey conceptually.⁶² Lorraine further reasons that by limiting others’ lines of flight, I limit my own, therefore my power to act is dependent on the ability of all to act. While these modifications help to broaden a Deleuzian ethics and give shape to a related world of beings, for the purposes of my project here, Nancy and Levinas offer a framework that I find more productive. Whatever the category of the human may mean, there is a way in which the life form that has been given that title is uniquely responsible to and for the world. By world, I mean to other beings, including animals, to their histories and to the environment. It is the case that ‘humans’ seems to be particularly adept at damaging the environment, animals and each other. This is the category of life, however historically contingent, that I mean to address as potential spectators. Although a traditional notion of subjectivity is undone by both Levinas and Nancy, there is still a subject, just one that is dependent on, vulnerable to and constituted with others. There is also room for animals and plants and even rocks (particularly in Nancy). For these reasons, I find Levinas and Nancy more compelling than Deleuzian approaches for thinking through the ethics of film.

   Finally, in contrast to Deleuze-and-Guattarian models, which tend to move away from the language of difference and towards that of becoming, my account is still invested in formulating how to conceive of difference. The model developed in Chapter 3, drawing on Levinas, emphasises difference based on the unknowability of the other as opposed to a recognition or identity-based model.⁶³ The feminist perspective offered here attempts to forge a complex middle ground between approaches that are entrenched in sexual difference as the key to understanding spectatorship and Deleuzian approaches which may miss sexed identity altogether in their emphasis on flows and molecular becomings. As Elena del Río writes in her book on Deleuze and the Cinemas of Performance, ‘A Deleuzian model of the body as an impersonal flow of forces may arguably fall short of meeting the political needs of a feminist position that still finds it necessary to differentiate between the sexes, and to maintain a distinct notion of female subjectivity as individuated molar identity.’⁶⁴Rather than completely doing away with identity, I acknowledge the tension between real and materially productive categories and their inadequacy with respect to accounting for the world and our capabilities. Chapter 2, for example, discusses Nénette and Boni’s depiction of teen pregnancy and the ways in which Denis challenges stereotypical images of motherhood to move us towards something else entirely; that is, a focus on an exposure to the other’s singularity, a sensory and dynamic encounter that cannot be fully understood or finalised. This is in contrast to a notion of representation that enables clear meaning and completion. Rather than turning to Deleuzian forces and syntheses at the pre-individual level, the focus is on how we encounter the other through cinema. As Adrián Pérez Malgosa writes in his book on affect and intercultural cinema, he wants to ‘theorize film and cinematic reception as areas of cultural tension where the subject both emerges and is constantly questioned’.⁶⁵ In a sense, the emergence and interrogation of the subject is a process that my project echoes – cinema participates in producing particular forms of subjectivity, and is also a site where it is continually brought into question and reconfigured. The ongoing solidification of the subject and its paradoxically tandem dissolution applies both to the spectator and to the characters within Denis’s filmic worlds. The tension between identities and their limitations with respect to accounting for our interrelated and complex experiences are key to the model put forth here." (Towards a Feminist Cinematic Ethics: Claire Denis, Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Luc Nancy, Kristin Lené Hole, 2016, pp. 20–22)

-> I think that it is impossible to reduce the psychological concepts of behaviour and experience to the biological level, but we can arise them to the sophisticated level. We have human 'brain' and 'sensation'. The requiment sowie by Dogen in Zen-Buddhism is not to reduce, but rather to overcome. Thus we have to accept own natural being who not idealize by self–It's self-awareness in a part of 'Satori'.

My Ph.D. artistic research focus on contemporary art.

In my series projects, "B.O.D.Y." is a book and assemblage, and also a project "still/silent is a book that is an assemblage. Thereby artistic collective OIO in this project is a geistige Assemblage that I conceptualized and worked together with Antonis Anissegos, Chris Dahlgren and Niklas Schmincke. OIO is based on the idea of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus "Therefore a book has no object. As an assemblage, a book has only itself, in connection with other assemblages and in relation to other bodies without organs." – our improvisational compositions that I call 'geistige Assemblage'.

OIO was started with Antonis Anissegos, Erika Matsunami, and Kyota Takahashi in Berlin, 2006. It was a project "trans +O" by OIO.

How it worked:

OIO is not a musical ensemble, we didn't rehearsal together and didn't discuss. We (OIO)'ve never sheared own work, it's autonomy and we worked independently. OIO is being only in performance, which is in the Installation. OIO's performance is 'Site-Specific'. Antonis Anissegoss (GR/DE), Chris Dahlgren (USA/DE), Kyota Takahashi (JP), Erika Matsunami (JP/DE), Niklas Schminke (DE) had different contexts of phenomenology. How we realized Deleuze and Guattari's idea in a performance concept, for example, Kyota Takahashi had not the context of musical composition, however he has worked in the context of visual composition, and thereby I've worked in-between of the context of musical and visual compostion in a Project "trans +O". 

The themes of performances were rhizomatic, but each was in the same context. Our attempt was thereby to reach a new sense in the context of the project "still/silent", which was not stereotypical artistic expression of such as 'peace'.

An example in visual art, it were such as the art work of Robert Rauschenberg. He had dealt with colour and shape untypically that was not for viewing, but rather his approach was for new sense. 

OIO's approach for new sense is by compositional NI, not by the high technology.

"still/silent" – OIO solo:

During this performance "still/silent" - OIO solo in a room, the data of wars on earth after 6 and 9. August 1945 until 2011 were projected on the wall. This performace was started from the data in 1945, and the ending of this Data was the end of this performance. The end of the Second World War was not the end of war in the world.

On collective Memory in the Project "still/silent": I mean that a day 6.8.1945 in Hiroshima in this project. Who were there in that day, they were not only Japanese, also Koreans and American soldiers were there. Collective memory in the human history is always depressing. I'm critical towards collectivity of the ideology, conversely, therefore OIO is a geistige Assemblage.

In this intellectual assemblage OIO in the project "still/silent", everyone as a composer in a piece has the "author right", thus I have registered all pieces with GEMA, Germany. The pieces are legally recognized as a collective composition. I conceptualized the catalog "still/silent" (The contents of the monograph "still/silent")

"(...) So analytic philosophy is concerned with analysis – analysis of thought, language, logic, knowledge, mind, etc; whereas continental philosophy is concerned with synthesis – synthesis of modernity with history, individuals with society, and speculation with application.

(...)

Postmodernism as Modern Continental Philosophy

On the continent of Europe, existentialism largely ended with Sartre and de Beauvoir, but a succession of other movements there have continued a general trend of sceptical, anti-authoritarian philosophy. Structuralism gave way to post-structuralism and, with Jacques Derrida, to deconstructionism. Foucault examined issues of government control, madness and sexuality; Baudrillard raised questions on hyper-reality and simulacra, and Vattimo resurrected nihilism. These various developments are all loosely called ‘postmodernism’. It’s a hard term to define, but what can be said is that it is about the task of deconstructing absolute views of reality, truth, value, and meaning. The meta-narratives of German Idealism come sharply under scrutiny in postmodernism, for these overarching systems of meaning have, in the postmodern view, only left their hopefuls sadly disappointed. Postmodernists view parts of analytic philosophy as similarly too optimistic and overly self-satisfied – for instance, analytic philosophy’s trust in logic and science can be seen as ignoring the big issues of meaning and existence. Postmodernism can now be seen as a main terminus within continental philosophy for continuing many of its classical traditions.

Philosophy of Mind as Modern Analytic Philosophy

In the late twentieth century philosophy of mind became one of the main concerns of analytic philosophy. Hilary Putnam, one of the great pioneers of modern philosophy of mind, introduced ideas that he thought would solve the problem of how the mind and the brain relate. He became one of the founders of functionalism, a theory which analyses mental states in terms of their function. He also put forth a theory of ‘multiple realizability’, which posits that differing types of physical entities could experience the same mental state if there were the right organisational similarities. By contrast, Donald Davidson became the champion for a theory known as ‘non-reductive physicalism’, which states that only physical objects can cause physical effects, but that the mind is not entirely reducible to the physical brain. David Chalmers, director of the Center for Consciousness at Australian National University, has argued that the mind cannot be reducible to the physical brain because of various hypothetical arguments, including the possibility of zombies. All of these theories are within the tradition of analytic philosophy." (Ways of Knowing: Analytic versus Continental Philosophy, Kile Jones)

Research subject in Auditory perception is not for new viewing or new idea (A new viewing could be made by a new idea.), but rather this research topic is for new sensations. I mean a new sense like an auditory sense of performativity in Schaeffer's work.

-> Liquid Water - Object (Sbustance) - Environment

- Buoyancy

- Evaporation

- Liquid water and its mechanical properities

- Substance and Condition

In a biological body -> Capillary action

“B.O.D.Y. – そして、それから_et ainsi de suite/Rhizom”, work in progress (2014–15)

I deal with the subject “Wandel” (transition, alteration, vicissitude, flux) and “(Um-)Wandlung” (transfiguration). These subjects will be marked by the intensification and phenomenal convention of colors, shapes, and materials in the installation from time to time. Rhizome – this is not only the forms of objects, but rather this is both in the rhizomatic connection of associations with the outside world and philosophical debate “Dispositive (dispositif)” in this project.

The red-colored water (red liquid) plays a substantial and semantic role in the installation and objects; the color "red" is the complementary color to the “blue” sea (and blue sky). This "red" liquid is in contrast to mineral liquid. The threads in the object and in the installation suck the red liquid and in this way the phenomenon of evaporation of red liquid arises to blow off materiality and shapes which are relating to the originality of the threads from day to day.

There is no definition or concrete statement. It involves association through the shaping and color, minimal creation, and the intensity of the perceptual color stimuli.

Installation:

Technique: spatial installation, mixed media (wood (pine) with varnish on wood and organic wood oil on wood, threads, Plexiglas, red water with hibiscus (from organic cultivation in Egypt))

Dimensions: w. 220 cm x d. 100 cm x h. approx. 300 cm (variable)

Images: B.O.D.Y. – そして、それから - et ainsi de suite / Rhizom, installation and drawings, the Exhibition "Zerreißprobe, OCEAN contemporary #1", Galerie GEDOK-Berlin, Germany, Opening Reception: April 25th, April 26 – June 20, 2015