ANOTHER LOGIC

 

In the realm of scientific method, a hypothesis is tested through experimentation, subjected to rigorous review. The unknown or unexplored situation that the hypothesis identifies as its subject is taken as an inhibitory rupture or break, which needs to be carefully filled or bridged by the production of new knowledge. The hypothesis might be conceived as a preliminary or preparatory moment within a given enquiry — it creates the premise for what follows. However, the hypothesis may also be considered pre-liminal, for it marks the entrance of a threshold zone between the known and the unknown, where things are neither yet proven nor disproved. It is a double-headed arrow, since it looks towards the conditions of the present-past for stimulus, whilst gesturing forwards to the future; to the (imagined) arrival of clearer understanding, towards the moment of realisation. Through the ritual of the experiment, the researcher practises the alchemical turning of the unknown into what can be known, the making consistent of what has hitherto lacked form or definition. Yet thresholds can be crossed in both directions, where what is known can as easily be transformed into what is no longer recognisable or certain. Here, another logic emerges, less concerned with expanding the limits of what is known than with increasing the spaces of indeterminacy along its borders. This other logic is not a critique of scientific method as such, but neither is it the wholesale borrowing of its terms. Rather, it is the emergence of a concurrent way of knowing that reveals moments of porosity or elasticity within existing structures of knowledge, taking pleasure in exposing the presence of perceptual or cognitive gaps. It is the inquisitive finger that finds holes in anticipation of teasing them further open, for the pleasure of pulling at their loose threads. Released from the stranglehold of teleological knowledge production, the formulation of hypotheses emerges as autonomous critical activity, no longer bound by the repetitious cycles of testing and validation to which is it conventionally subjected. Conjecture is rescued from the pejorative, recast as the pleasurable reverie of the thinking mind engaged in nascent speculation.


From Emma Cocker, How Do You Do? (Nottingham: Beam Editions, 2023)